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BOOK REVIEW
BORK'S APOLOGIA
THOMAS M. MELSHEIMER*
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW.
By Robert H. Bork. New York: Free Press, 1990. Pp. xiv, 432.
$22.50.
On July 1, 1987, Senator Edward Kennedy took the
microphone on the floor of the Senate and proclaimed before a na-
tionwide television audience, in tones and words intended to evoke
action, and perhaps panic, the following assessment of a judge then
sitting on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit:
Robert Bork's America is a land in which women would be forced
into back alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch
counters, rogue police could break down citizens' doors in mid-
night raids, school children could not be taught about evolution,
writers and artists would be censored ... and the doors of the
federal courts would be shut on the fingers of millions of citizens
for whom the judiciary is often the only protector of the individ-
ual rights that are the heart of our democracy.'
Senator Kennedy's characterization was the opening salvo of one
of the most intense and vitriolic political battles of the 1980's. In
the end, Judge Robert Bork's nomination to fill the Supreme Court
vacancy created by the resignation of Justice Lewis Powell was de-
* B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Texas Law School. Assistant
United States Attorney, Northern District of Texas; Adjunct Instructor in Law, Southern
Methodist University School of Law. The views expressed in this review are those of the
author only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Justice.
I Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
33 (1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
feated by a decisive margin in the Senate.2
The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law3 represents Judge Bork's intellectual counterattack. With the
battle surrounding his nomination long over, Judge Bork has at-
tempted to do what he was not permitted to do throughout the
nomination process-set out, in clear terms, a coherent judicial
and constitutional philosophy.4 In addition, Bork has set out a
"view from the front" of the political battle and provides a com-
prehensive account of the reports, rumors, charges, and counter-
charges that characterized his nomination.5 (Bork's book is filled
with military 'similes and metaphors and this review cannot avoid
military imagery.)
Bork's personal account of his nomination is entitled "The
Bloody Crossroads," which refers to the "crossroads where politics
and law meet."6 It is at these crossroads that Bork, to his dismay,
encountered "a seemingly ceaseless torrent of falsehoods about
[his] views and record." A detailed assessment of the factual accu-
racy of Bork's account of his nomination is beyond the scope of
this review. But this much is certain: Bork's account is a powerful
antibody to some of the more virulent attacks on his views. For the
record, Bork is not anti-black, anti-women, or anti-working class.
He does not, nor has he ever, "advocated" a return to segregated
lunch counters or gestapo-style police searches. Nor should it come
as any surprise that Bork is not "for" compulsory sterilization 8 or
"against" contraception.9 The fact that any of these things could
2133 CONG. REc. 515, 011 (1987).
R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
Judge Bork, of course, has expressed his views in a variety of non-judicial publica-
tions, perhaps most notably in The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy At War With Itself (1978).
Nowhere before, however, has he set out a far-ranging explanation of his constitutional
jurisprudence.
' R. BORK, supra note 3, at 271-316.
' Id. at 269. Bork paraphrased Lionel Trilling's description of the crossroads where
politics and literature meet. See L. TRILLING, THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION 10 (1979).
R. BORK, supra note 3, at 269.
Bork's participation in the review of a decision by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration concluding that a particular action by an employer did not fall
within the Occupational Safety and Health Act, see Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l
Union v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984), was cited by an unin-
formed Senator Metzenbaum as an example of Bork's "pro-sterilization" bent. R. BORK,
supra note 3, at 306-07, 327.
9 Bork's scholarly critique of the reasoning in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), was widely cited as evidence of his "anti-contraceptive" view. See, e.g., Washington
Post, Sept. 15, 1987, at A9 (Planned Parenthood advertisement depicting Bork as extremist
[Vol. 64:2:413
BORK'S APOLOGIA
have been said (and in some quarters believed) about a man who
spent over a decade in estimable public service is a troubling testa-
ment to this country's tabloid democracy. This section of Bork's
book merits reading for this reason alone.
That Bork is not a man brimming with malice toward all does
not mean he was wrongfully denied a seat on the Court. History
will make that judgment. Nor does it mean that his scholarly and
powerful explication of his own constitutional philosophy is wholly
persuasive. Indeed, the religious fervor with which Bork advances
the theory of original understanding overstates the utility of the
theory in constitutional decision-making. A brief evaluation of
Bork's constitutional theory is the goal of this review.
Bork's book opens by tracing the development of two centu-
ries of Supreme Court cases, beginning with Calder v. Bull0 and
ending with the more recent Texas flag burning case, Texas v.
Johnson." Throughout, Bork notes the progress of "constitutional
revisionism" and the imposition by the Court of moral values not
enshrined in the Constitution by the Framers:
From first to last the Court has been a strong force for centraliza-
tion in our national life. With the Marshall Court that was a de-
liberate strategy of solidifying national powers. But any Court
that imposes values not found in the Constitution to that degree
makes national policy that obliterates local and state policies.
The New Deal Court centralized with gusto by refusing to limit
Congress's powers over commerce, taxation, and spending. The
Court in the era of Earl Warren and after has imposed political
and moral uniformity across wide areas of American life. 2
The imposition of non-constitutional values by the Court thus cre-
ates a polity "governed not by law or elected representatives but
by an unelected, unrepresented, unaccountable committee of law-
yers applying no will but their own."'"
Bork's familiar attack on non-originalist constitutional juris-
prudence is far-ranging. He finds fault, sometimes with the result
and always with the reasoning, in dozens of Supreme Court deci-
who rejects concept of right to personal privacy).
10 3 U.S. (3 DALL.) 386 (1798).
11 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). Bork not only criticized the decision, but, in the months fol-
lowing the decision, vigorously advocated a constitutional amendment prohibiting flag
burning.
12 R. BORK, supra note 3, at 129.
13 Id. at 130.
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sions. No era escapes his criticism, but the decisions of the Warren
Court are the focus of his most savage criticism. 14
Bork's discussion of Shelley v. Kraemer15 provides a good
non-Warren Court example of what Bork perceives to be the con-
stitutional problem resulting from the departure from the original
understanding of the Constitution. Shelley involved racially re-
strictive covenants that prevented landowners from selling their
property to blacks. When the landowners attempted to sell in vio-
lation of the covenants, white owners of neighboring properties
sued to prevent blacks from purchasing the properties. The state
courts upheld the restrictions as valid, thus preventing blacks from
occupying the properties. In reversing, the Court reasoned that the
state court's enforcement of the restrictive covenants constituted
"state action" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment
and was thus a violation of that amendment's guarantee of equal
protection.'
Shelley fails as a constitutional decision, in Bork's analysis be-
cause it is a non-neutral application of the otherwise valid consti-
tutional principle of "state action," the notion that the fourteenth
amendment operates as a restriction only upon state governments
and not private citizens. Neutrality, for Bork, embraces three dis-
tinct levels: the level at which the principle is derived, the level at
which the principle is defined, and the level at which the principle
is applied. Only the theory of original understanding, in Bork's
opinion, enables a judge to derive, define, and apply constitutional
principles with neutrality.
The principle of state action was not neutrally applied in
Shelley. According to Bork:
The Supreme Court in Shelley said that the decision of a state
court under common law rules constitutes the action of the state
14 See id. at 69-100. Bork writes that the rate of constitutional revisionism became "ex-
plosive" under Chief Justice Warren, whom he called a "judicial radical." Id. at 130-31.
Bork attributes some of the problems regarding his nomination to his earlier criticism of
Warren. Id. at 349. Bork referred to the nomination debacle as "the revenge of the Warren
Court." Id.
15 334 U.S. 1 (1948). For Bork's treatment of Shelley v. Kraemer, see R. BORK, supra
note 3, at 151-53.
"6 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
17 See R. BORK, supra note 3, at 146-53. Bork borrows from Professor Herbert Wechsler
the view that reasons for a particular judicial decision must in "their neutrality transcend
any immediate result that is involved." See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Consti-
tutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959).
[Vol. 64:2:413
BORK'S APOLOGIA
and therefore is to be tested by the requirements of the Constitu-
tion. The racial discrimination involved was not the policy of the
state courts but the desire of private individuals, which the courts
enforced pursuant to normal, and neutral, rules of enforcing pri-
vate agreements.18
In Bork's view, the Court went out of its way to reach a result that
favored blacks in an opinion whose general principle-action of a
state court is action of the state under the fourteenth amend-
ment-could not be applied sensibly outside the context of the ob-
vious racial discrimination present in the case.' 9
Bork cites many other examples of ultra vires judicial deci-
sion-making. The "right of privacy" cases take several turns on
Bork's intellectual spit and are characterized as an unwarranted
judicial imposition of a morality not supported by the text of the
Constitution. In Bork's view, these cases pervert traditional con-
cepts of legal reasoning and substitute morally desirous results for
ones that can be justified by principled analysis. "The Court em-
ploys sort of a reverse syllogism: from the result we may infer the
minor and major premises.""' Thus, from a desire to protect a wo-
man's right to abort a fetus, the Court infers principles about the
"fundamental" nature of certain decisions. The decision whether
to bear or beget a child in Griswold v. Connecticut" becomes the
decision to abort in Roe v. Wade,22 and later emerges, for the four
dissenters in Bowers v. Hardwick,23 as the decision to engage in
homosexual sodomy.
Bork's defense of the original understanding theory possesses
an almost religious intensity. He dismisses contrary views as heret-
ical.24 He will never be accused of interpretive ecumenism.
The religious metaphor in constitutional interpretation is par-
ticularly appropriate and has been cultivated and refined by the
constitutional "revisionist" Sanford Levinson.25 In his highly ac-
18 R. BORK, supra note 3, at 152.
"9 Bork's view here is sensible and is neither an indication that he is "pro" racially
restrictive covenants nor that he is "anti" black.
2o R. BORK, supra note 3, at 264.
21 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
24 See R. BORK, supra note 3, at 6. Originalism "is the American orthodoxy. The heresy,
which dislocates the constitutional system, is that the ratifiers' original understanding of
what the Constitution means is no longer of controlling, or perhaps of any, importance." Id.
21 See id. at 217-18. Levinson's analysis of the religious strains in constitutional inter-
1990]
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claimed book Constitutional Faith,26 Levinson draws on one of the
fundamental tensions in western religious thought-the tension
between protestantism and catholicism-to illustrate his views
about constitutional interpretation." "Protestantism" is shorthand
for an adherence to a belief that revelation is found exclusively, or
nearly so, in the words of scripture. "Catholicism" is shorthand for
an adherence to a belief that revelation, in addition to being found
in the written word, is also manifested in the traditions and teach-
ings of the institutional Church.2"
Bork is a Protestant interpreter of the Constitution and its
principles. He relies mainly on the text of the Constitution. His
reliance is limited to discerning what the original drafters of the
document meant by the language they employed.
That Bork's interpretation is "correct" is far from obvious,
any more than Billy Graham's interpretation of a particular bibli-
cal passage is necessarily "correct." Interpreting the Constitution
is far more complex than interpreting a will or a contract between
two parties. Constitutional terms like "due process," "equal pro-
tection," and "cruel and unusual punishment" are expansive and
imprecise. 9 Indeed, it is questionable whether a court, applying
common law contract principles, would even choose to enforce a
contract that purported to guarantee the parties "due process."
The provision might be considered void or unenforceable on the
grounds of vagueness.
But such an option is not available when dealing with a docu-
ment that establishes itself as the "supreme Law of the Land."3
Or is it? According to Bork, certain constitutional language must
pretation provides illumination of both the appeal and the limits of Bork's exclusive reliance
on a text-rooted approach.
28 S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
27 Id. at 18-53.
28 Id. at 18-19, 27. Levinson observes:
It should be clear by now that the ability of "the Constitution" to provide the
unity so desperately sought as a preventive against disorder depends on the reso-
lution of the same [interpretative] issues that split Judaism, Christianity, Islam,
and, indeed, all other religions that have texts as a central part of their structure.
... Only if there is widespread agreement on "principles and methods of correct
interpretation" can a written Constitution be said to be a source of stability.
Id. at 51.
2 See, e.g., Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 515 (1964) (quoting concurring opinion in United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946), where Justice Frankfurter asserted that such terms are
"broad standards of fairness" which permit a wide range of legal interpretation).
20 See U.S. CONsT. art VI.
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remain moribund precisely because it is too vague for its plain
meaning to be interpreted and there exists insufficient evidence to
determine what the drafters intended. Relegated to moribund sta-
tus, for example, is the ninth amendment, 'which, as some scholars
have pointed out, seems to compel reference to a variety of rights
not delineated by name in the Constitution.3' Bork writes:
There is almost no history that would indicate what the Ninth
Amendment was intended to accomplish. But nothing about it
suggests it is a warrant for judges to create constitutional rights
not mentioned in the Constitution.2
Bork is not at his best here. As a Protestant interpreter he is un-
comfortable with the idea of departing from scripture. Such a de-
parture invites anarchy, or worse, an assertion of control by the
institutional "Church" known as the Supreme Court. Bork cannot
assent to the proposition that the ninth amendment's broad and
expansive reference to rights "retained by the people" gives the
federal courts the authority to look beyond the Constitution's text
in order to protect a right of privacy or any other right not specifi-
cally enumerated in the text. Bork's position in this regard is sup-
ported by neither the words of the ninth amendment nor the in-
tent of its drafters, because, as Bork himself points out, the intent
of the drafters is unclear. Bork's Protestant interpretation leaves
him paralyzed. He must simply cast the ninth amendment aside. A
fundamental deficiency in the original intent approach to constitu-
tional jurisprudence, as Levinson points out, is that it requires
more than just a simple ascertainment of what the Framers
"meant. 33 Bork argues that this process involves no moral choices
and thus no opportunity for a judge to impose his morality on
others. Indeed, for Bork, this is the beauty of original intent. It
allows judges to vindicate the choices made by the Framers instead
of imposing their own nebulous, undemocratic notion of morality.
Bork observes:
The moral philosophers of constitutional revisionism will ... be
unable to persuade all of us to accept either their premises or
their conclusions. There is going to be no moral philosophy that
can begin to justify courts in overriding democratic choices where
"1 See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 34-41 (1980) (discussing ninth
amendment and unenumerated rights).
22 R. BORK, supra note 3, at 183.
33 See S. LEVINSON, supra note 26, at 77-78.
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the Constitution does not speak.
The judge who takes as his guide the original understanding
of the principles stated in the Constitution faces none of these
difficulties. His first principles are given to him by the document,
and he need only reason from these to see that those principles
are vindicated in the cases brought before him."'
Reliance on original intent, however, cannot supplant the need to
make moral choices. Levinson provides a memorable example of
this problem. Suppose a baby-sitter has written instructions from a
parent that her son must "under no circumstances" remain at the
sitter's house past 5:00 p.m. At 4:58 p.m., as the sitter sends the
child out the door, a tornado makes its way down the street. 5 How
does a sitter remain faithful to the instructions in such a situation?
The instructions are quite clear and admit to no exceptions. None-
theless, achieving the "right" result, keeping the child from being
exposed to the tornado, requires going beyond the text and impos-
ing a value on the instructions, a value that may or may not be
shared by the drafter. If the sitter decides to keep the child from
leaving and thus decides to violate the literal terms of the instruc-
tions, he can justifiably do so only by making an assessment of the
values held by the parent-drafter. In other words, he must assume
that the parent's highest concern is the welfare of the child and
that the vindication of that concern requires "violating" the in-
structions. This assessment is no easy task and becomes even more
difficult in the context of broad constitutional provisions such as
"equal protection of the laws" or "due process." The values sought
to be vindicated by these phrases are often unclear. 6
To continue with Levinson's example, suppose the sitter
knows the parent to be a child abuser who might take perverse
delight in having the child exposed to risk. Under Bork's approach,
the sitter cannot override the values of the parent, no matter how
sordid.37 The sitter is stuck with the results "intended" by the
drafter.
Levinson's example can be complicated further. Suppose the
instructions were drafted by both parents-one, a child abuser, the
34 R. BORK, supra note 3, at 257.
11 S. LEVINSON, supra note 26, at 81-82.
See Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. Rrv. 445, 458 (1984).
" R. BORK, supra note 3, at 146. Once a judge finds a constitutional principle as origi-
nally understood, "he need not, and must not, make unguided value judgments of his own."
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other, not. How is the sitter to resolve the interpretative conflicts?
He cannot, at least not with exclusive reliance on a theory of
intent.
Bork deals with the type of problem Levinson presents in a
brief discussion of another constitutional revisionist, Dean Paul
Brest." Brest's observation is now familiar: the derivation of the
values inherent in a particular constitutional provision requires an
"arbitrary choice among levels of abstraction. 3 9 In other words,
the breadth with which a judge reads the term "equal protection"
turns on a choice whose ultimate roots are external to the term.40
Bork admits this problem and points to "the words, structure, and
history of the Constitution" as his limiting principles.41 But Bork's
formula does not eliminate discretion and value judgments. How
much is the "plain meaning" of a term to be tempered by the Con-
stitution's structure? What happens when "history" is ambiguous?
The limits of original intent were illustrated in the controver-
sial decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.42 Hardwick had been charged
with violating a Georgia criminal statute proscribing sodomy.
Hardwick challenged the law in federal court, arguing that the de-
cision to engage in the prohibited sexual activity was beyond the
reach of state regulation because of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court rejected this argument and held
the law a valid exercise of state authority.43
Bork applauds the Bowers decision for its refusal to engage in
moral analysis by finding rights not explicitly set forth in the Con-
stitution.44 The Constitution says nothing about sodomy, and any
decision by the Court invalidating a state sodomy law would be
nothing more than the vindication of its own moral values. All law
is based on morals, as Bork acknowledges,45 and there is no such
thing as a moral "fact" to which the Constitution requires assent.
Thus, unless specifically prohibited by the Constitution, Georgia's
11 R. BORK, supra note 3, at 148-49; see Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:
The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063
(1981).
" Brest, supra note 38, at 1091.
40 See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretation and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 791 (1983).
41 R. BORK, supra note 3, at 150.
42 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
43 Id. at 191.
" R. BORK, supra note 3, at 119.
5 Id. at 122.
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moral choice to outlaw sodomy must stand.
A choice has, however, clearly been made by the Bowers ma-
jority; a choice favoring the state's authority to regulate the con-
duct of its citizens. Bork suggests that the theory of original under-
standing can keep all moral decisions in the hands of legislators,
yet he ignores the fact that judicial review of such decisions will
force a court to take sides in a moral dispute.46 The role of original
understanding in this process is unclear. The ninth amendment's
broad reference to "rights retained by the people" is broad enough
to include a right to engage in certain sexual conduct. To hold that
such conduct is beyond the scope of the ninth amendment, when
the language is unclear and the historical record murky, requires a
moral assessment (perhaps the correct one) that certain rights are
worthy of protection and others are not.
This discussion highlights two significant problems in the orig-
inal understanding theory: defining what intent is and determining
whose intent counts. Bork defines intent textually and thus blends
the two problems together. "[W]hat the ratifiers understood them-
selves to be enacting must be taken to be what the public of that
time would have understood the words to mean. 41 7 Thus, intent is
what the words mean and the source for such meaning is "the
words used and . .. secondary materials, such as debates at the
conventions, public discussion, newspaper articles, dictionaries in
use at the time, and the like. '48
But words did not have immovably fixed meanings in 1789,
nor do they today. Moreover, many of the secondary materials,
such as records of the ratifying conventions, are speeches of indi-
viduals advocating or opposing particular provisions, and thus
46 The Court will impose either its own morality or that of the Framers.
'7 R. BORK, supra note 3, at 144.
4" Id. Bork easily dismantles a caricature of the original intent approach that suggests a
search for intent requires a judge to "gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on applica-
tion of principle to specific, contemporary questions." See Justice Brennan, Speech at the
Text and Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985) (reprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTER-
PRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 11 (1986)). No sensible theory of intent has ever ad-
vanced the "requirement that the judge know what the specific intention of the law-giver
was regarding the case at hand." R. BORK, supra note 3, at 162. Rather, as Bork observes:
[AIll that a judge committed to original understanding requires is that the text,
structure and history of the Constitution provide him not with a conclusion but
with a major premise. That major premise is a principle or stated value that the
ratifiers wanted to protect. . . . The judge must then see whether that principle
of value is threatened by the statute or action challenged in the case before him.
Id. at 162-63.
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their value in determining what the words "mean" in any objective
sense is limited.49
Bork, more than anyone, should recognize this inherent limita-
tion. He spends one third of his book refuting the charges made by
the political opponents of his nomination to the Court. He accuses
his opponents of political savagery. Two hundred years from now,
would Bork want his principles and positions on a variety of issues
discerned by reference to the public debates and media accounts
surrounding his nomination?
But Bork will admit to the utility of no other theories. Indeed,
he spends three entire chapters of his book refuting theories of in-
terpretation not based on original understanding.50 The unyielding
quality of his argument may well provide some clue to the vitriol
that surrounded Bork's nomination to the Court. By rejecting the
value of all forms of constitutional interpretation save one, he
seems to be sanctioning an interpretive arrogance that is unsettling
to many, and not just to the "liberal elite" who are the target of so
much of Bork's book.'
It is certainly true, for example, that in 1791 the Framers con-
templated that the imposition of the death penalty was constitu-
tional. Yet they did not use the words: "the death penalty shall in
all events be permitted." Instead, the Constitution employs a more
flexible phrasing: "cruel and unusual punishment [shall not be] in-
flicted. ' 52 A theory of interpretation exclusively rooted in original
understanding freezes the meaning of "cruel and unusual" in 1791
and does not permit it to evolve with society. Moreover, one can-
not escape the suspicion, even after nearly 400 pages of Bork's
keen prose, that he is using his theory to sanction outcomes he
believes are politically desirable. Thus, for example, in his opinion
in Olman v. Evans,53 Bork allows the means of protecting first
amendment values to evolve with society. He writes:
"' See Tushnet, supra note 40, at 793-96.
50 R. BORK, supra note 3, at 187-250.
61 Id. at 9. ("departure from the original meaning of a statute or of the Constitution,
resulted in the judicial enactment, or attempted enactment, of an item on the modern lib-
eral agenda"). "The liberal elites will not be satisfied with blocking the nomination of judges
who may be expected to adhere to the historic principles of the Constitution." Id. at 10.
"They intend to root that idea out of the intellectual life of the law. .. ." Id. "Law school
moral philosophy... turns out upon examination to be only a convoluted way of reaching
the standard liberal or ultra-liberal prescriptions of the moment." Id. at 35.
52 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
-3 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
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Perhaps the framers did not envision libel actions as a major
threat to [freedom of speech] .... But if, over time, the libel
action [evolves so that it] becomes a threat to the central mean-
ing of the first amendment, why should not judges adapt their
doctrines."4
First amendment jurisprudence can change to meet new circum-
stances not foreseen by the Framers. Yet for Bork, the notion of
what constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" within the
meaning of the eighth amendment cannot so evolve. 5 This seems
to be precisely the sort of political judging of which Bork is so
critical.
Who, then, is seducing whom? Bork's theory of original under-
standing cannot avoid political and moral choices. Choices are
made in Bork's jurisprudence sub silentio and without
explanation.
Bork writes out of a fear that the willingness of the federal
courts to depart from the original understanding of the Framers is
undermining this country's democratic structure. For him, the val-
ues of a few are allowed to displace the free choices of the many.
Many liberal commentators ignore the notion that the "free choice
of the many" is a value that merits respect.56 Bork recognizes the
importance of this value and believes that the original understand-
ing is the only interpretive guide that can both vindicate demo-
cratic choice and prevent such choices from overriding clearly ex-
pressed constitutional values. He observes:
When a court strikes down a statute, it always denies the freedom
of the people who voted for the representatives who enacted the
law. We accept that more readily when the decision is based upon
a fair reading of a constitutional provision. The Constitution, af-
ter all, was designed to remove a number of subjects from demo-
cratic control, subjects ranging from the composition of the
Houses of Congress to the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. But when the Court, without warrant in the Constitution,
strikes down a democratically produced statute, that act substi-
, Id. at 996 (Bork, J., concurring).
" R. BORK, supra note 3, at 9.
" See id. at 199-207. Bork points to Professor Laurence Tribe as an example of how
the more extreme variants of constitutional liberalism undermine democratic choice on a
variety of social and moral issues without producing a governing principle that could ration-
ally limit such undermining. See id. at 204-05 (discussing Tribe's assertion that an individ-
ual's "liberty" may in some instances make laws regulating narcotics and pornography
unconstitutional).
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tutes the will of a majority of nine lawyers for the will of the
people.517
This is familiar stuff, yet it remains powerful in its simplicity and
its embrace of democratic values.
Nonetheless, Bork's theory does not provide the sort of intel-
lectual and moral "glue" needed to hold the polity together. By
refusing to acknowledge the choices inherent in the application of
the original understanding theory, he fails to provide a coherent
theory of how such choices are to be made. Moreover, by denying
the need for moral choices while actually making them, he raises
suspicion about his intentions and true "agenda."' ' 8
Bork's extended discussion of Brown v. Board of Education59
is telling in this regard. He believes that Brown was rightly decided
although "it must be said in all candor that the decision was sup-
ported by a very weak opinion. '60 The result, of which Bork says
he is an admirer, is not supported by the original intent of the
drafters of the fourteenth amendment.6 1 According to Bork, "The
ratifiers probably assumed that segregation was consistent with
equality but they were not addressing segregation. ' 62 Nonetheless,
because decades of experience had demonstrated that segregation
did not and could not produce the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, the Court could no
longer countenance segregation. Bork concludes: "Since equality
and segregation were mutually inconsistent, though -the ratifiers
did not understand that, both could not be honored. When that is
seen, it is obvious the Court must choose equality and prohibit
state-imposed segregation."63
This last passage is quite remarkable. Bork concludes that the
ratifiers, the source of the original understanding on which he ba-
ses his constitutional theory, were wrong. Because they were
57 Id. at 264.
8 It is interesting to note, for example, that the "advance praise" that decorates the
back cover of Bork's book comes from well-known, ultra conservative politicians and com-
mentators-Ronald Reagan, Allan Bloom, Milton Friedman, Irving Kristol, and George
Will.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
R. BORK, supra note 3, at 75.
81 See Perry, Interpretivisim, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 Omo
ST. L.J. 261, 300 (1981) ("segregated public schooling was present to the minds of the Fram-
ers; they did not intend that the [equal protection] clause [should] prohibit it").
11 R. BORK, supra note 3, at 82.
e3 Id. (emphasis added).
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wrong, their original understanding could not be followed and the
more general principle, equality, had to be vindicated. If the ra-
tifiers believed that they were not outlawing segregation, would not
it have been more faithful to their understanding to permit segre-
gation? Other originalists have long supported this position. 4
Bork's position is curious for it suggests again that he is guilty
of the same sort of "political judging" which he opposes. This is
troubling because he is so adamant in his assertion that the theory
of original understanding avoids implicating the political prefer-
ences of the decision-maker. Brown, of course, was rightly decided
and Bork is correct to assert so. His position is not supported,
however, by the views he espouses. If the ratifiers were "wrong"
with respect to segregation, why could they not have been wrong
with respect to the death penalty, abortion, and a host of other
controversial issues? To these questions, Bork does not provide a
satisfactory answer.
Bork concludes his book with an unintended paradox. He lam-
bastes the politicization of the judicial confirmation process as a
symptom of the overall politicization of the law:
This book has traced the increasingly political nature of the Su-
preme Court, which reached its zenith with the Warren Court,
and the increasing . . . politicization of the law schools, where
much constitutional scholarship is now only politics. When the
Court is perceived as a political rather than a legal institution,
nominees will be treated like political candidates, campaigns will
be waged in public, lobbying of senators and the media will be
intense.... ."
Bork's "brave, new world" is "new" only to him. "Politics" is a
pejorative term Bork uses to describe the constitutionally man-
dated "advice and consent" role of the Senate. And such politics
are not simply a weapon of "liberal hegemony" 66-just ask Justice
Fortas, a man whose academic and intellectual credentials rivaled
" See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 117-33 (1977) (examination of various sources which evidence that
neither ratifiers of Constitution nor 39th Congress, in enacting fourteenth amendment, in-
tended to abolish segregation); L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECI-
SIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS 21 (1976) (discussing meaning of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), author notes that adoption of fourteenth amendment in 1868 did
not prohibit school segregation, as practice continued to exist with congressional approval
after amendment's enactment).
11 R. BORK, supra note 3, at 348.
66 Id. at 337-43.
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Bork's and whose nomination as Chief Justice met an untimely
death at the hands of Southern senators who did not like his
politics.
The recent nomination of Justice David Souter to the Su-
preme Court provided an interesting test case for Judge Bork's
prediction that the politicalization of the nomination process will
result in the selection of judges "who have not written much, and
certainly nothing that could be regarded as controversial by left-
leaning senators and groups. . . .The tendency, therefore, will be
to nominate and confirm persons whose performance once on the
bench cannot be accurately, or perhaps even roughly, predicted by
either the President or the Senate." 7
Bork's observations were prescient. Certainly, Justice Souter
qualifies as a man about whom little was known prior to the nomi-
nation. His most salient qualifications are his anonymity and his
lack of intellectual battle scars on the issues of abortion or civil
rights. Indeed, Souter has been portrayed in the popular media as
a reticent man removed from the world-a lifelong bachelor who
enjoys best the quiet company of his books in an isolated New
Hampshire farm-house. If this nomination was the result of the
"Bork war," little has been won by either side. In a nation often
bitterly divided on issues of abortion and race, to name but two,
arid and isolated intellectualism is no potion.
Bork's constitutional jurisprudence puts great faith in the
democratic process and believes that expansive readings of the
Constitution beyond the precise scope envisioned by the Framers
debilitates that process. Yet the process to which he is prepared to
leave almost all decisions effecting the polity is the same process
that rejected him and his theory of judging. To be sure, the politics
to which Judge Bork was subjected was often unsophisticated and
even tawdry. But Bork is no more a "victim" of this process than
anyone else who ends up on the losing end in a democratic vote.
Unlike many such "losers," however, Bork retains, as The Tempt-
ing of America demonstrates, a substantial forum from which to
champion his cause.
67 Id. at 347.
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